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Abstract
We study statistical discrimination of individuals based on payoff-irrelevant social
identities inmarkets where ratings/recommendations facilitate social learning among
users. Despite the potential promise and guarantee for the ratings/recommendation
algorithms to be fair and free of human bias and prejudice, we identify possible vul-
nerability of the ratings-based social learning to discriminatory inferences on social
groups. In our model, users’ equilibrium attention decision may lead data to be sam-
pled differentially across different groups so that differential inferences on individ-
uals may emerge based on their group identities. We explore policy implications in
terms of regulating trading relationships as well as algorithm design [to be added].
JEL Classification Numbers:
Keywords: ratings-based social learning; statistical discrimination; directed search;
algorithmic fairness.
1 Introduction
Discrimination of individuals based on their race, gender, ethnicity and other social
identities, is a pervasive problem. While the problem is as old as humanity, it has taken
on a new meaning and form at digital marketplaces and social media where our social
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and economic interactions increasingly take place. Evidence suggests that discrimination
is prevalent in popular online platforms such as airbnb (Edelman et al. (2017) and Cui et
al. (2019)), freelancing worksites (Hanna´k et al. (2017)), ride-sharing platforms (Ge et al.
(2016)), and math Stack exchange (Bohren et al. (2019)).
At first glance, online platforms are an unlikely place for discrimination to occur,
given the widely-used ratings system that facilitates social learning among users. Plat-
forms for ride-sharing, house-sharing, freelancing, credit, and insurance collect informa-
tion about drivers, customers, guests, workers, and loan and insurance applicants based
on performers’ past records and user experiences. Platforms then aggregate the infor-
mation into simple ratings, and make recommendations based on these ratings. It is now
routine that machine algorithms pre-screen re´sume´s of job applicants, evaluate loan or
insurance applicants and freelance workers, recommend their promotion or firing, and
rates recidivism of parolees.
By limiting subjective human judgment and replacing it with accurate information
and objective recommendation, one would think that data-driven social learning should
limit the scope for statistical discrimination. Intuitively, there should be simply less room
for statistical inference on an individual based on his/her group identity—and therefore
discrimination based on it—if one is guided by more accurate information about his/her
individual characteristics. The logic of this reasoning is at first glance plausible, and in-
deed, if full information were available, discrimination, except based on tastes, should
disappear.1 However, it is not at all clear that more information and social learning
should necessarily lead to less discrimination.
Most importantly, it is not clear that social learning mechanisms at the heart of these
platforms work fairly and unbiasedly to mitigate discrimination. At a high level, social
learning involves a feedback of two processes: (1) the sampling of data (or experience) and
(2) the informing (or recommending) of user decisions. The latter process is fair or unbiased,
or one can at least guarantee it to be so—in keeping with the recent call for algorithmic
fairness. However, the former process is neither random nor unbiased. Data is sampled
when transaction occurs, and this process is dictated by the economic interests of parties:
users seek reliable, trust-worthy, high-value partners with favorable ratings, not random
or representative ones—a far cry from the idealized notion of statistical sampling. With-
out a deeper understanding of this feedback process, particularly the selective nature of
sampling, one cannot truly understand the fairness of social learning and its implications
for discrimination.
1 There is some empirical evidence that reputation/ratings ameliorate discrimination in some contexts (see Cui et al. (2019) and
Bohren et al. (2019)).
2
The purpose of the current paper is to build a model of social learning that accounts
for this feedback process and investigate its implications for statistical discrimination.
Specifically, we study the possibility of, and the extent to, which social learning through
ratings can ameliorate or exacerbate statistical discrimination of social groups.
Our model features directed search/matching between two sides, (masses of long-
lived) buyers and sellers, guided by user-contributed ratings. Each seller is indexed by her
social group identity j = 1,2 and her productive type, H (“high”) or L (“low”): a seller’s
group identity is unchanging, but her productive type changes over time, according to
a continuous time Markov chain. The group identity is payoff irrelevant since it has
no effect on sellers’ productive types. Buyers seek to match and trade with sellers; the
surplus generated from trade is higher if the seller is of high type rather than a low type.
The search-matching process is frictional, and is guided by imperfect information
about sellers’ types, called ratings. The rating is binary, either G or B, and is updated
after each trade. Although it is impossible for the ratings to perfectly reveal the sellers’
types due to the ever changing nature of seller type (except in the limit), we parameterize
the effectiveness of social learning, or the extent to which the ratings “track” sellers’ true
types, by α ∈ (0,1)—the probability that an incorrect rating gets corrected (e.g., type-
H seller having G-rated) after each transaction. Buyers direct their search attention to
sellers based on their ratings and possibly on their group identities: a seller of a given
rating j = G,B and group ℓ = 1,2 matches with probability that depends on the number
of buyers directing attention to the sellers with (j,ℓ). We study the steady state of this
system.
Absent any ex ante bias in belief updating, discrimination may still arise from the
selective nature of data sampling mentioned earlier. In our model, data on a seller is
sampled whenever the seller gets matched, and matching (thus sampling) arises from
buyers’ search for sellers with favorable beliefs. A positive feedback loop can then ensue
since sellers with a favorable posterior belief will get sampled more, and those believed to
have been sampled more often but maintained G rating would enjoy even more favorable
belief than those with the same G-rating but believed to have been sampled less often. We
identify a positive feedback loop that could lead to a systematic statistical discrimination
of social groups.
To begin, the payoff irrelevance of group identity means that there always exists a
“non-discriminatory” equilibrium in which sellers of the two groups are treated identi-
cally. In this equilibrium, a seller of any given rating enjoys the same amount of atten-
tion regardless of her group identity; a G-rated seller enjoys a higher match/employment
rate than a B-rated seller, due to the more favorable signal contained in the former, but
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identically across the group identities. Identical treatment by buyers across the social
groups means that there is no bias in the sampling process between the groups, and this
in turn leads to the identical updating of beliefs based on the group identity. Hence,
non-discrimination survives and perpetuates in steady state.
However, a non-discriminatory equilibrium need not be the unique or even stable
steady state.2 There could be another steady state that is discriminatory in the follow-
ing sense. Suppose buyers direct search attention toward G1 sellers (G-rated sellers in
group 1) away from G2 sellers (G-rated sellers in group 2). This leads to G1 sellers being
sampled more often than G2 in the steady state and to a more intensive weeding out of
type L sellers from G1 sellers than from G2 sellers. This in turn leads to G1 sellers en-
joying more favorable posterior beliefs than G2 sellers and validates the more intensive
attention G1 sellers are receiving. Hence, the feedback loop is now complete, supporting
a discriminatory equilibrium in which buyers favor G1 sellers over G2 sellers. Interest-
ingly, the same feedback loop does not exist between B1 and B2 sellers, the B-rated sellers
in groups 1 and 2, respectively. Say B1 sellers receive more attention from buyers than B2
ones. This makes the ratings of former sellers more accurate, which, however, leads to a
less favorable belief for those sellers. Hence, the initial shift of the attention toward B1 gets
self-corrected. In the steady state, therefore, B1 and B2 sellers are treated identically.3
In sum, group 1 sellers are favored than group 2 sellers in this discriminatory equilib-
rium, despite there being no payoff relevance of the group identity and no bias in either
the algorithmic rating/recommendation and belief updating. A discriminatory equilib-
rium need not always exist, but interestingly, when it does, the non-discriminatory steady
state may become unstable; a small perturbation in terms of buyers shifting their atten-
tion toward one group may break non-discriminatory equilibrium and trigger a shift that
leads to a discriminatory equilibrium. Our analysis shows that a discriminatory equilib-
rium exists if the matching friction is small and social learning friction is of intermediate
value. This suggests that the advance of the online marketplace, as measured by the re-
duction of these frictions, may have a non-monotonic effect on discrimination. The econ-
omy could very well begin with high enough frictions on both accounts that support only
the non-discriminatory equilibrium. With an advance in matching and social learning,
2As will be seen, stability is defined in the usual manner, by the robustness of an equilibrium to small perturbations.
3Note that this is observationally equivalent to firms paying more attention to the workers in one group than those in the other,
resulting in differential rewarding across the groups for (perceived) high quality. Interestingly, this behavior is consistent with the
empirical findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and Bartosˇ et al. (2016): Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) performed field
experiments by sending out fictitious re´sume´s to help-wanted ads under white-sounding and black-sounding names. They find that
not only re´sume´s by white-sounding names receive more call-backs for interview s than those by black-sounding names, but the
call-back rates gap between high-quality and low-quality re´sume´s is significantly higher for the former group than for the latter.
Similar field experiments were performed by Bartosˇ et al. (2016) on the pre-screening behavior in job application and apartment
application contexts; they find that the advantaged group receives more scrutiny in the former (“cherry-picking”) context whereas a
disadvantaged group receives more scrutiny in the latter (“lemon-dropping”) context.
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frictions may diminish and a discriminatory equilibrium may emerge.
The current paper joins the long-line of research on discrimination. In particular, our
research follows the literature of statistical discrimination originated by Phelps (1972)
andArrow (1973).4 Unlike the tasted-based theories of discrimination (see Becker (1957)),
this literature explains group inequality and stereotype as resulting from rational statis-
tical inferences on groups’ characteristics. In Phelps (1972) and its modern incarnations,
discrimination originates from exogenous differences in group characteristics,5 whereas
Arrow (1973) derives average group differences, and the associated differential treatment,
as an endogenous equilibrium behavior. In the same spirit, Coate and Loury (1993b) and
the subsequent literature focus on workers’ skill acquisition as a source of discriminatory
group stereotyping:6 if employers view a certain group as less skilled and thus become
more selective against them for assigning higher-paying positions, the affected group will
indeed lose incentives for acquiring skills, thus fulfilling the employers’ adverse beliefs
on that group.
Our paper is also related to the burgeoning literature in computer science on ethical
algorithm (see Dwork et al. (2012), Corbett-Davies et al. (2017), Kearns et al. (2018), and
Kleinberg et al. (2018), among others). This literature explores ways to ensure that de-
cision/recommendation algorithms satisfy a variety of fairness standards. The current
paper qualifies the effectiveness of this approach, by identifying the possibility that algo-
rithmic fairness alone may not be enough to accomplish a fairness goal. In our model, a
discriminatory equilibrium may arise even when the rating algorithm treats both groups
identically, as long as agents (buyers in our model) can interpret the ratings in a way that
can lead to discriminatory sampling. The debate on algorithmic fairness must keep this
aspect of social learning into consideration, so that either the interpretational scope is
totally eliminated to guarantee outcome fairness, an approach that appears to be in line
with the prescription of Kleinberg et al. (2018), or in case that is impossible, the ratings
system may be designed to counteract the interpretational response by the users.
2 Model
We consider a frictional search market in which buyers (or firms) search for sellers (or
workers) of unknown types.
4 The earlier theories focus on taste-based discrimination. See Becker (1957).
5Cornell and Welch (1996) explains discrimination and its inter-generational persistence from group-specific evaluational famil-
iarity. Bohren et al. (2019) and Monachou and Ashlagi (2019) focus on the “mis-specified” prior beliefs as a source of discrimination.
6 See Coate and Loury (1993a), Mailath et al. (2000), Moro and Norman (2003), Norman (2003), and a survey by Fang and Moro
(2011).
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Players. There is a unit mass of sellers in the market. The sellers are indexed by two
characteristics, type and group. The type of a seller represents any payoff-relevant infor-
mation, such as the productivity or quality of the seller. At a given moment, a seller is
either of high type (H) or low type (L). Each seller’s type, however, changes according to a
continuous-time Markov process. Specifically, each type turns into the other type at rate
δ > 0. The group of a seller describes her payoff-irrelevant identity, such as her gender,
ethnic or racial identity. Each seller belongs to either group 1 or 2, with ℓ = 1,2 being
used as the generic index. Unlike her type, a seller’s group does not change over time.
For strong symmetry between the two groups, we assume that both groups have the same
total size (i.e., each group has mass 1/2).
On the other side of the market, there is mass Q(> 0) of buyers. They search for sellers
based on public information about sellers. Specifically, they condition their search on
sellers’ two observable characteristics, rating j = G,B and group identity ℓ = 1,2.
The sellers who share the same observable characteristics, (j,ℓ), and the buyers that
search for them constitute a “submarket.” Clearly, each submarket can be indexed by
(j,ℓ). Sellers are assigned to those submarkets according to their (perfectly persistent)
group identity and (evolving) ratings, while buyers choose which submarket to enter.
Matching. We adopt the canonical search-and-matching framework to model an in-
teraction between sellers and buyers. We assume that matching technology is common
across all submarkets and exhibits constant returns to scale. The latter assumption im-
plies that all agents’ matching rates in each submarket depend only on the ratio λ of
buyers to seller in the submarket. We let ψ(λ) denote a seller’s matching rate and φ(λ)
denote a buyer’s matching rate. Note that consistency requires that ψ(λ) = λφ(λ) for all
λ > 0: matching is one-to-one, and thus the number of matched sellers should be identical
to that of matched buyers at each point in time.
For expositional clarity, we focus on the parametric case where ψ(λ) = λk for some k ∈
(0,1). This corresponds to the constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas matching function
and, therefore, satisfies various natural and desirable properties.7 In particular, ψ(0) = 0,
limλ→∞ψ(λ) = ∞, ψ
′(λ) > 0, and ψ′′(λ) < 0. In addition, φ(0) = ∞, limλ→0φ(λ) = 0,
φ′(λ) < 0, and φ′′(λ) > 0. As becomes clear later, most of our results require only these
7 Formally, let f (b,s) denote the measure of matched formed at each instant when there are mass b of buyers and mass s of sellers.
If f (b,s) = bk s1−k , then the rate at which each individual seller is matched with a buyer is given by
ψ (λ) ≡ ψ
(
b
s
)
=
f (b,s)
s
=
bks1−k
s
=
(
b
s
)k
= λk .
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standard properties of the matching function and, therefore, easily generalize beyond our
parametric case.
Trade. Once a buyer and a seller meet, they transact instantaneously and go back to the
market.8 The transaction yields surplus uH if the seller’s type is H and uL if the seller’s
type is L, where uH > uL ≥ 0. If a buyer transacts with a seller, the buyer pays p(≥ 0) to the
seller. In order to exclude trivial cases, we assume uH > p (so that there are gains from
trade when a seller is of type H), but consider both the case when uL > p and the case
when uL ≤ p.
Ratings. Market accumulates information about sellers through simple summary in-
dices, called “ratings.” There are two possible ratings: G (as in “good”) and B (as in
“bad”). When searching for sellers, buyers can only observe the current rating of the
sellers; no information about sellers’ underlying types or their past ratings history is
available to them. After each transaction, the seller’s rating may be updated to reveal her
type. Specifically, with probability α ∈ (0,1], a B-rated seller with type H receives G rat-
ing, and a G-rated seller with type L receives G rating. A seller with correct rating keeps
the same rating after a transaction. With remaining probability 1 − α, the seller’s rating
remains unchanged. Note that due to the changing environment (or changing type), a
correct rating may turn inaccurate.
Buyers’ beliefs over a seller’s type will depend on the rating, and the (equilibrium)
behavior of all players in the system. In particular, the belief may depend on the group
identity. If the two groups of agents are treated differently, the inference a buyer makes
on a seller with a given rating depend nontrivially on her group identity. This will be
made clear in our analysis.
Solution Concept. We consider a steady state of the economy in terms of the distribu-
tion of sellers of different types, ratings and group identity, and the beliefs that the buyers
hold for each submarket. Specifically, an equilibrium is a tuple {(Pℓij ,λ
ℓ
j ,µ
ℓ
j )}
ℓ=1,2
i=H,L,j=G,B in
the stationary distribution, where Pℓij is the mass of sellers of type i with rating j and
group ℓ, λℓj is the ratio of buyers to sellers in submarket (j,ℓ), and µ
ℓ
j ∈ [0,1] is the public
belief on the sellers in submarket (j,ℓ), i.e., the probability that they are of type H . Note
that the masses of buyers who participate in alternative submarkets are determined by
the first components.
8 The assumption on instantaneous transaction makes the model more naturally applicable for one-shot relationship such as free-
lance independent work and insurance or loan purchase. It is conceptually straightforward, but technically complicated, to extend
our model to capture the canonical persistent employment relationship.
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3 Non-Discriminatory Equilibrium
We begin by studying equilibria in which buyers search for sellers only based on
their ratings and do not distinguish between the two groups. As in other statistical-
discrimination models, this equilibrium always exists and provides a benchmark for dis-
criminatory equilibria studied in Section 4. Several technical results in this section will
also be useful in Section 4.
3.1 Steady-State Distribution
In non-discriminatory equilibrium, buyers condition their search strategies only on
sellers’ ratings. Therefore, effectively, there are only 2 submarkets indexed by rating
j = G,B. For each j = G,B, let qj denote the measure of buyers that join submarket j and
Pij denote the measure of type i = H,L sellers with rating j = G,B. Then, the ratio of
buyers to sellers (“queue length”) in submarket j = G,B is given as follows:
λj ≡
qj
PHj +PLj
.
Our matching technology implies that a j-rated seller is hired by a buyer at rate ψj ≡
ψ(λj ), while a buyer in submarket j successfully finds a seller at rate φj ≡ ψj/λj .
In steady state, Pij ’s must satisfy the following system of equations:
PHGδ = PLGδ +PHBψBα,
PLG(δ +ψGα) = PHGδ,
PHB(δ +ψBα) = PLBδ, and
PLBδ = PHBδ +PLGψGα.
In each equation, the left-hand side represents the outflow of sellers from status (i, j),
while the right-hand side quantifies the corresponding inflow. For example, consider
PHG. Due to our rating technology (with no false negative), a type H seller with rating G
changes his status only when his type changes to L, which occurs at rate δ (thus, −PHGδ).
On the other hand, a type L seller with rating G becomes type H at rate δ (thus +PLGδ).
In addition, a type H seller with rating B improves his rating to G once he meets a buyer
and receives a good rating (thus +PHBψBα). In steady state, net flow must be equal to 0,
which yields the first equation.
The following result is straightforward from the above equations.
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Lemma 1 (Steady-state Distribution). In steady state, the measure of sellers with type i =H,L
and rating j = G,B is given as follows:
PHG =
ψB(δ +ψGα)
2(δ(ψG +ψB) +αψGψB)
, PLG =
ψBδ
2(δ(ψG +ψB) +αψGψB)
,
PHB =
ψGδ
2(δ(ψG +ψB) +αψGψB)
, PLB =
ψG(δ +ψBα)
2(δ(ψG +ψB) +αψGψB)
.
Letting µj ≡ PHj/(PHj +PLj ) for each j = G,B,
µG = 1−
δ
2δ +ψGα
and µB =
δ
2δ +ψBα
.
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Notice that for each j = G,B, the fraction µj of type H sellers in submarket j depends
only on ψj . This is due to the fact that ψj ′ has the same proportional effect on PHj and PLj ,
and thus PHj /PLj is independent of ψj ′ . More concretely, our rating technology involves
no type-I errors, and thus a seller’s rating improves from B to G only when her type is H ,
while her rating falls from G to B only when her type is L. This implies that in each sub-
market, the mass of sellers with wrong rating (PLG in submarket G, and PHB in submarket
B) is fully determined by the mass of sellers with correct rating (PHG in submarket G, and
PLB in submarket B) and the matching rate of the submarket (see the second and the third
equations in the above system of equations). This drives the convenient independence
property of µj .
In addition, µG increases in ψG, while µB decreases in ψB. This is intuitive: an increase
in ψG or ψB can be interpreted as better/faster screening of sellers. Therefore, a seller
with rating G becomes more likely to be type H as ψG increases. Similarly, a seller with
rating B becomes less likely to be type H (more likely to be type L) as ψB increases.
3.2 Buyers’ Expected Payoffs
Let uj denote a buyer’s flow expected payoff when he targets j-rated sellers (i.e.,
searches in submarket j). Given the steady-state queue length λj and the fraction µj
of type H sellers, uj is given by
uj = φj (µjuH + (1− µj )uL − p).
There are the following two cases to consider.
9
(i) uj ≤ 0: This case arises if and only if
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µjuH + (1− µj )uL − p ≤ 0⇔ µj ≤ µ ≡
p − uL
uH − uL
.
This is when a buyer’s utility from a type L seller falls short of the price p (i.e.,
uL < p) and the probability that a buyer meets a type L seller is sufficiently large. In
this case, clearly, no buyers search in submarket j, that is, λj = 0.
(ii) uj > 0: Opposite to (i), this arises if and only if µj > µ. In addition, it must be that
a positive measure of buyers search in submarket j and, therefore, λj > 0: if λj = 0,
then a participating buyer would meet sellers infinitely frequently, each of whom
gives the buyer a positive expected payoff µjuH + (1 − µj )uL − p > 0), and thus his
expected payoff becomes unbounded.
Recall that φj = φ(λj ) and in steady state, µj is also a function only of λj (see Lemma
1). Therefore, uj also can be interpreted as a function of λj . Interestingly and importantly,
whereas uB(λB) is always monotone, uG(λG) may not be monotone, as formally reported
in the following lemma (and shown in Figure 1).
Lemma2. Suppose that (yH+yL)/2 > w. For both j = G,B, limλj→0uj(λj ) =∞, limλj→∞uj(λj ) =
0, and uj(λj ) is continuous. uB(λB) is always strictly monotone (decreasing), while uG(λG) is
monotone if and only if
k ≤ k ≡
1+
√
1− uH−uL
2(uH−w)
2
.
If k > k, then there exist λG(> 0) and λG(> λG) such that uG(λG) is strictly increasing if and
only if λG ∈ (λ,λ).
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
This result is due to the fact that µB(λB) is decreasing in λB, while µG(λG) is increas-
ing in λG (Lemma 1). Since a seller’s matching rate φ(λ) always decreases with relatively
more sellers (i.e., higher λ), the utility effect of increasing λ is always negative in submar-
ket B but ambiguous in submarket G. Lemma 2 shows that the quantity effect (through
φ(λG)) always dominates the quality effect (through µG(λG)) if λG is sufficiently small or
sufficiently large: the former is because the quantity effect (φ′(λG) = (k − 1)λ
k−2
G ) is ar-
bitrarily large when λG is close to 0, while the latter is because as λG tends to infinity,
the quality effect vanishes faster than the quantity effect. Given these observations, it
9 If λj = ∞ then φj = 0, and thus uj = 0 even if µjuH + (1 − µj )uL − p > 0. However, this case clearly cannot be sustained in
equilibrium.
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uG
λG0
uG
λGλG λG
Figure 1: The blue solid curves shows buyers’ expected payoffs in submarket G, as a
function of λG. The common parameter values used for this figure are δ = α = 0.1, uH = 2,
and uL = w = 1 (which leads to k = 0.8536). k = 0.7682 in the left panel, while k = 0.8828
in the right panel.
is intuitive that the quality effect can outweigh the quantity effect, and thus uG(λG) de-
creases, over an interval if and only if k is sufficiently close to 1 (so that given λG > 0,
φ′(λG) = (k − 1)λ
k−2
G is close to 0).
3.3 Equilibrium Characterization
We now characterize non-discriminatory steady-state equilibria of our model. The
following result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for there to be no trade in
equilibrium.10
Proposition 1. If (uH + uL)/2 ≤ p, then it is the unique non-discriminatory steady-state
equilibrium outcome that buyers do not search for sellers, regardless of their ratings (i.e.,
λG = λB = 0). Conversely, if (uH + uL)/2 > p, then buyers search for both ratings of sellers
(i.e., λG,λB > 0).
Proof. Suppose that λj = 0. Since ψj = ψ(λj ) = 0, by Lemma 1, µj = 1/2. But then,
µjuH + (1− µj )uL − p =
uH +uL
2
− p.
Therefore, λj = 0 (no trade in submarket j) can be an equilibrium if and only if (uH +
uL)/2 ≤ p. Since this condition is independent of rating j, it is either λG = λB = 0 or
10Note that Proposition 1 argues only uniqueness of no trade outcome, not that of symmetric steady-state equilibrium. This is
because in no-trade equilibrium, there is no seller movement between submarkets G and B, and thus any distribution of sellers can
be sustained as long as µG = µB = 1/2.
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λG,λB > 0. Q.E.D.
This result is fairly intuitive. Since both types of sellers change their types at an iden-
tical rate, the unconditional proportion of type H sellers is 1/2 in steady state: recall
that in Lemma 1, (PHG + PHB)/
∑
i,j Pij = 1/2. If there is no trade, then there is also no
market learning, that is, a seller’s rating becomes uninformative of his type (observe that
µG = µB = 1/2 if λG = λB = 0). Therefore, no trade outcome can be sustained if and only if
(uH +uL)/2 ≤ p.
Now consider the case where (uH +uL)/2 > p, so that λG,λB > 0. In this case, searching
buyers receive positive surplus (i.e., µG,µB > 0), and thus it is necessarily the case that all
buyers search. Therefore, in equilibrium, the following “market clearing” condition must
hold:
qG + qB =Q.
Since λj = qj /(PHj + PLj ) for each j = G,B, this condition can be rewritten, in terms of
(λG,λB), as follows:
Q = λG(PHG +PLG) +λB(PLG +PLB)
=
λGψB(2δ +αψG)
2(δψG + δψB +αψGψB)
+
λBψG(2δ +αψB)
2(δψG + δψB +αψGψB)
. (1)
In addition, in equilibrium, a buyer must be indifferent between submarket G and
submarket B, that is, the following buyer-indifference condition should hold:
φG(µGuH + (1− µG)uL − p) = uG(λG) = uB(λB) = φB(µBuH + (1− µB)uL − p). (2)
This equation shows a buyer’s trade-off between ratings G and B. By Lemma 1, it is
always the case that a seller is more likely to be type H when his rating is G than when
his rating is B (i.e., µG ≥ 1/2 ≥ µB). This makes rating G attract relatively more buyers
than rating B, which reduces a buyer’s chance to hire a G-rated seller (i.e., λG > λB, and
thus φG < φB). In equilibrium, λG and λB are such that a buyer is indifferent between the
two submarkets.
Combining the two conditions leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. If (uH + uL)/2 > w, then there always exists a non-discrimatory steady-state
equilibrium in which λG > λB > 0.
Proof. Let λMCB (λG) be the implicit function defined by equation (1). It is straightforward
that limλG→0λ
MC
B (λG) = ∞ and limλG→∞λ
MC
B (λG) = 0. In addition, since the right-hand
12
λB
λG0
λBIB (λG)
λMCB (λG)
λB
λG0
λBIB (λG)
λMCB (λG)
Figure 2: The blue solid curves depict the buyer-indifference condition (2), while the red
dashed curves depict the market clearing condition (1). The common parameter values
used for this figure are δ = 1, α = 0.1, uH = 2, and uL = w = 1 (which leads to k = 0.8536).
k = 0.8682 in the left panel, while k = 0.9121 in the right panel.
side of equation (1) increases in both λG and λB, λ
MC
B (λG) is monotone.
11 Similarly, let
λBIB (λG) be the implicit function defined by equation (2). By Lemma 2, limλG→0λ
BI
B (λG) =
0, limλG→∞λ
BI
B (λG) > 0, and λ
BI
B (λG) is continuous. Therefore, there exists λ
∗
G > 0 such
that λ∗B ≡ λ
MC
B (λG) = λ
BI
B (λG). By construction, the pair (λ
∗
G,λ
∗
B) constitute a non-discriminatory
steady-state equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Figure 2 explains the argument behind Proposition 2. The red dashed curves repre-
sent the market clearing condition (1). They are always decreasing from infinity to zero
as λG increases, which is because the right-hand side is increasing in both λG and λB. The
blue solid curves capture the buyer-indifference condition (2). As shown in Figure 2, they
are not necessarily monotone, which is because, whereas uB(λB) always decreases, uG(λG)
may increase over an interval (Lemma 2). Nevertheless, they are always continuous, start
from 0 and eventually stay away from 0, and thus the two curves always intersect.
As exemplified by the right panel of Figure 2, there may exist multiple equilibria.
This is, again, because the buyer-indifference condition may produce a non-monotone re-
lationship between λG and λB (i.e., the implicit function λ
BI
B (λG) may not be monotone).
Clearly, if k ≤ k (in which case λBIB (λG) is monotone), then there always exists a unique
non-discriminatory equilibrium. Even if k > k, it is often the case that non-discriminatory
11 For the result with λG , one can express the right-hand side as follows:
(λG/ψG)ψB(2δ +αµG)
2(δ + δψB/ψG +αψB)
+
λBψG(2δ +αψB)
2(δ + δψB/ψG +αψB)
.
The desired result follows from the fact that φ(λ) = ψ(λ)/λ is decreasing in λ, while ψ(λ) is increasing in λ.
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equilibrium is unique (see the left panel). However, there is a non-negligible set of pa-
rameter values that yield multiple equilibria.12
4 Discriminatory Equilibrium
In this section, we investigate discriminatory equilibria in which buyers condition
their search strategies on sellers’ identities as well as their ratings. We first derive a con-
dition under which such equilibria exist and then compare them to non-discriminatory
equilibria studied in Section 3.
4.1 Notation and Assumption
We use the same notation as in Section 3 but distinguish the two groups with super-
scripts ℓ = 1,2. For example, we denote by qℓj the measure of buyers who are targeting
j-rated sellers in group ℓ, and Pℓij the measure of sellers with type i, rating j, and group ℓ.
Within each group ℓ = 1,2, sellers follow the same transition dynamics as in the non-
discriminatory case. Therefore, Lemma 1 applies unchanged to each group. In particular,
for each ℓ = 1,2, the proportion of type H sellers in submarket jℓ is given as follows:
µℓG ≡ µG(λ
ℓ
G) = 1−
δ
2δ +ψ(λℓG)α
and µℓB ≡ µB(λ
ℓ
B) =
δ
2δ +ψ(λℓB)α
.
In addition, buyers’ expected payoffs are determined as follows:
uℓj (λ
ℓ
j ) = φ(λ
ℓ
j )(µ
ℓ
juH + (1− µ
ℓ
j )uL − p).
Proposition 1 also applies unchanged. Specifically, by the same logic and proof as
for non-discriminatory equilibria, there is no trade in any submarket if and only if (uH +
uL)/2 ≤ p. In addition, if (uH+uL)/2 > p, then trade must take place in all four submarkets.
Since the analysis is trivial for the no-trade case, from now on, we maintain the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. (uH +uL)/2 > p, and thus λ
ℓ
j > 0 for all j = G,B and ℓ = 1,2.
12 If there are multiple equilibria, then they are ranked in terms of buyer surplus: since the market-clearing condition is always
decreasing in λG , if there are two equilibria, (λG ,λB) and (λ
′
G ,λ
′
B), and λG < λ
′
G , then λB > λ
′
B. In this case, buyers’ expected payoffs
are necessarily higher with (λ′G ,λ
′
B), because µB is decreasing in λB (see Lemma 1), and thus uB(λ
′
B) has not only a higher value of
φ(λB) but also a higher value of µB .
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4.2 Existence of Discriminatory Equilibrium
We begin by presenting a necessary condition for the existence of discriminatory equi-
libria, namely that the function uG(λ) must be non-monotone, which is the case if and
only if k > k.
Proposition 3. If uG(λ) is monotone (i.e., k ≤ k), then there does not exist a discriminatory
equilibrium in which λ1B , λ
2
B or λ
1
G , λ
2
G.
Proof. In equilibrium, buyers must be indifferent over all 4 submarkets, that is,
uG(λ
1
G) = uB(λ
1
B) = uB(λ
2
B) = uG(λ
2
G).
Since uB(λ) is monotone, it is always the case that λ
1
B = λ
2
B. If uG(λ) is also monotone,
then it is also the case that λ1G = λ
2
G. Therefore, a discriminatory equilibrium cannot
exist. Q.E.D.
Let us first explain how the non-monotonicity of uG(λ) can lead to the existence of
discriminatory equilibria. Suppose that uG(λ) is non-monotone, and fix λB such that
uB(λB) = uG(λG) = uG(λ
′
G) for two distinct values, λG < λ
′
G: in Figure 3, it suffices to
choose λB ∈ [λB,λB]. Given λB and λG, let Q
1 be the value that supports (λB,λG) as a
non-discriminatory equilibrium, that is,
Q1 ≡
λGψ(λB)(2δ +αψ(λG))
2(δψ(λG) + δψB +αψ(λG)ψ(λB))
+
λBψ(λG)(2δ +αψ(λB))
2(δψ(λB) + δψ(λB) +αψ(λG)ψ(λB))
.
Similarly, let Q2 be the corresponding value for (λB,λ
′
G), that is,
Q2 ≡
λ′Gψ(λB)(2δ +αψ(λ
′
G))
2(δψ(λ′G) + δψB +αψ(λ
′
G)ψ(λB))
+
λBψ(λ
′
G)(2δ +αψ(λB))
2(δψ(λB) + δψ(λB) +αψ(λ
′
G)ψ(λB))
.
Suppose that Q =Q1+Q2, and consider a steady state in which λ1B = λ
2
B = λB, λ
1
G = λ
′
G,
and λ2G = λG. By construction, buyers are indifferent over all 4 submarkets, that is,
uB(λ
1
B) = uB(λ
2
B) = uG(λ
1
G) = uG(λ
2
G).
In addition, for both ℓ = 1,2, we have
Qℓ = λℓG(P
ℓ
HG +P
ℓ
LG) +λB(P
ℓ
HB +P
ℓ
LB).
Therefore, this (discriminatory) strategy profile is a steady-state equilibrium.
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λB
λB
λG λ
′
G
λB
λBIB (λG)
Figure 3: The blue solid curve represents the buyer-indifference condition (2). The pa-
rameter values used for this figure are δ = 0.2, α = 0.5, uH = 3, uL = 1, w = 1.5 (which
leads to k = 0.7887), and k = 0.8204.
This discriminatory equilibrium gives higher expected payoffs to group 1 sellers than
to group 2 sellers. Intuitively, this is because the two groups have the same matching
rate ψ(λB) with rating B, but the former have a higher matching rate than the latter
with rating G (i.e., ψ(λ1G) > ψ(λ
2
G)).
13 Let us emphasize that this discriminatory out-
come arises even if the two groups have no fundamental differences (including the size of
the group) and, perhaps more importantly, despite the fact that there may exist a unique
non-discriminatory equilibrium. In other words, unlike in some related papers, the pos-
sibility of discriminatory equilibria relies neither on any intrinsic differences between the
two groups nor on the equilibrium multiplicity of our underlying environment.
The mechanism behind our discriminatory equilibria is the novel feedback loop be-
tween ratings and trade. More buyers search for group 1 sellers because their ratings are
more informative (i.e., µ1G > µ
2
G). Conversely, group 1 ratings are more accurate because
they are hired and reviewed more frequently (i.e., ψ(λ1G) > ψ(λ
2
G)).
As shown by Proposition 3, this feedback effect never results in the existence of dis-
criminatory equilibria if uG(λ) is monotone. It may not work even if uG(λ) is not mono-
tone, depending on Q. Nevertheless, the following result shows that whenever uG(λ) is
not monotone, there is a positive measure of Q’s that give rise to discriminatory equilib-
ria.
13 To be precise, the following composition effect needs to be taken into account: more group 2 sellers are G-rated than group 1
sellers (i.e., P1G < P
2
G). However, it can be shown that this composition effect never outweigh the effect due to the difference in matching
rates: the unconditional matching rate PℓGψG(λ
ℓ
G) +P
ℓ
BψB(λ
ℓ
B) is increasing in both λG and λB.
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Theorem 1. If uG(λ) is not monotone (i.e., k ∈ (k,1)), then there existQ(> 0) andQ(> Q) such
that a discriminatory equilibrium exists if and only if Q ∈ (Q,Q).
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
In order to see why a discriminatory equilibrium does not exist ifQ < Q orQ > Q, note
that in our model, buyers use group identities only to improve informational content of
ratings. If Q is sufficiently small, then λℓj ≈ 0 for all jℓ, and thus ratings do not contain
much information (i.e., µℓj ≈ 1/2 for all jℓ). To the contrary, if Q is sufficiently large, then
each λℓj is large, and thus ratings convey precise information about sellers’ types (i.e., for
both ℓ = 1,2, µℓB ≈ 0, while µ
ℓ
G ≈ 1). In both cases, group identities do not add much more
information to ratings, and thus it is unlikely that buyers condition their search strategies
on them.
4.3 Stability of Ratings-based Discrimination
The analysis so far has demonstrated that non-discriminatory and discriminatory equi-
libria can coexist. The possibility of discriminatory equilibria is intriguing by itself, but
they would be unlikely to matter in practice if they could not be sustained in any robust
manner. We now examine whether (andwhen) discriminatory equilibria exhibit desirable
stability properties.
Since discriminatory equilibria can exist only when uG(λ) is not monotone, we mainly
focus on the case where k ∈ (k,1) throughout this subsection. In addition, so as to stream-
line the analysis, we also restrict attention to the parameter space that yields a unique
non-discriminatory equilibrium.
Assumption 2. For all Q ∈ R+, there exists a unique non-discriminatory equilibrium.
Since the market clearing condition is monotone in both λG and λB, this assumption
holds whenever the function uG(λ) does not increase too sharply, which is guaranteed if
k is close to k.
In order to provide a relevant stability concept, let U (q) denote buyers’ equilibrium
expected payoffs in the non-discriminatory equilibrium when the total measure of buyers
is given by 2q. In other words, if (λB,λG) is a non-discriminatory equilibrium with 2q
measure of buyers, then U (q) = uB(λB) = uG(λG). Proposition 2 and Assumption 2 ensure
that U (Q) is well-defined for all Q.
Both non-discriminatory and discriminatory equilibria can be summarized by a pair
(Q1,Q2) such that Q1 +Q2 = Q (market clearing) and U (Q1) = U (Q2) (buyer indifference
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among all 4 submarkets). The only difference between them is that an equilibrium is non-
discriminatory ifQ1 =Q2, while it is discriminatory ifQ1 ,Q2. Based on this observation,
we make use of the following tractable notion of stability.
Definition 1. An equilibrium with (Q1,Q2) is stable if U ′(Q1) +U ′(Q2) ≤ 0 and unstable
otherwise.
In order to understand this definition, fix a steady-state equilibrium with (Q1,Q2),
and suppose that a small measure of buyers move from group 1 to group 2, so that Q1−∆
measure of buyers search for group 1 sellers and Q2 + ∆ measure of buyers search for
group 2 sellers. After the change, if buyers targeting group 1 receive a higher expected
payoff than those targeting group 2, then those buyers who left group 1 will move back
to group 1, restoring the original equilibrium with (Q1,Q2). If it is the opposite, then
even more buyers would move to group 2, making the economy drift further away from
the equilibrium (Q1,Q2). Clearly, the (original) equilibrium is stable in the former case
and unstable in the latter case. Our stability definition captures this idea in a particularly
simple fashion. For the simple condition in the definition, observe that, since U (Q1) =
U (Q2),
U (Q1 −∆) ≥U (Q2 +∆)⇔−
U (Q1)−U (Q1 −∆)
∆
≥
U (Q2 +∆)−U (Q2)
∆
,
which reduces to U ′(Q1) +U ′(Q2) ≤ 0 in the limit as ∆ tends to 0.
We first apply our stability notion to non-discriminatory equilibria.
Proposition 4. Fix a non-discriminatory equilibrium in which λℓB = λB and λ
ℓ
G = λG for both
ℓ = 1,2. The equilibrium is stable if and only if uG(·) is decreasing at λG.
Proof. In a non-discriminatory equilibrium, Q1 = Q2 = Q/2. Therefore, it is stable if
and only if U ′(Q/2) ≤ 0. Since the market clearing condition (1) always expands as Q
increases, this is equivalent to the equilibrium value of λB increasing in Q (so that uB(λB)
decreases), which in turn holds if and only if uG(·) is decreasing at λG.
Q.E.D.
Recall that if k ≤ k, then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium, which is non-
discriminatory (Propositions 2 and 3). Proposition 4 suggests that the unique equilibrium
is stable, which is desirable. It further suggests that even if a non-discriminatory equilib-
rium coexists with discriminatory equilibria, the former may be stable, but not always. If
an equilibrium lies on a decreasing region of uG(·) (either λG ≤ λG or λG ≥ λG), then it is
stable. Otherwise (i.e., λG ∈ (λG,λG)), the equilibrium is unstable.
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Can a discriminatory equilibrium be stable? The following result argues that (there
is a sense in which) discriminatory equilibria are more likely to be stable than non-
discriminatory equilibria.
Theorem 2. Whenever there exists a discriminatory equilibrium, there exists a stable discrim-
inatory equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that a discriminatory equilibrium exists. By Theorem 1, this is the case
if and only if uG(λ) is non-monotone (i.e., k ∈ (k,1)) and Q ∈ (Q,Q). Now consider the
function g : [0,Q/2)→R such that
g(x) =U
(
Q
2
+ x
)
−U
(
Q
2
− x
)
.
Since U (Q) is finite, while limq→0U (q) = ∞, g(x) < 0 if x is sufficiently close to Q/2. In
addition, the existence of discriminatory equilibrium implies that there exists x∗ ∈ [0,Q/2)
such that g(x∗) = 0 (i.e., x∗ = |Q1−Q2|/2). Combining these with continuity of g , it follows
that there exists x∗∗ ∈ [x∗,Q/2) such that
g(x∗∗) = 0 and g ′(x∗∗) ≤ 0.
The first condition implies that (Q/2−x∗∗,Q/2+x∗∗) is a discriminatory equilibrium, while
the second condition implies that the equilibrium is stable. Q.E.D.
Note that Theorem 2 does not claim that all discriminatory equilibria are stable. There
may exist an unstable discriminatory equilibrium. Theorem 2 implies that if such an
unstable equilibrium exists, then there exists another discriminatory equilibrium that is
stable. Of course, it also implies that if there is a unique discriminatory equilibrium, then
it is necessarily stable.
4.4 Rating Quality and Discrimination
As ratings have become increasingly more prevalent, the associated technology also
has improved, extracting more (accurate) information from more users (buyers). Will
such a technological advance bring more fairness by weakening the role of prejudice in
decision making, or can it actually worsen discrimination? The following result shows
that the effect is non-monotone in general: an improvement in rating quality, measured
by β ≡ α/δ, may create discrimination initially.14 However, if the technology becomes
14Note that α and δ always enter the steady-state system together (see Lemma 1), and thus they cannot be separately identified.
Intuitively, α measures how fast ratings get corrected, while δ measures how fast ratings become obsolete. Therefore, their ratio,
β = α/δ, is the proper measure of rating quality.
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sufficiently effective, then discrimination becomes unsustainable.
Proposition 5. Fix k > k and Q > 0. There exist β(> 0) and β(> β) such that a discriminatory
equilibrium exists if and only if β ∈ (β,β).
Proof. Let λ′ ≡ λβ1/k . Then, the two equilibrium equations, (1) and (2), can be written as
follows:
Qβ1/k =
λ′Gψ
′
B(2 +ψ
′
G)
2(ψ′G +ψ
′
B +ψ
′
Gψ
′
B)
+
λ′Bψ
′
G(2 +ψ
′
B)
2(ψ′G +ψ
′
B +ψ
′
Gψ
′
B)
,
and
φ(λ′G)
(
1+ψ′G
2+ψ′G
(uH − uL) +uL − p
)
= φ(λ′B)
(
1
2+ψ′B
(uH − uL) +uL − p)
)
.
Notice that β appears only on the left-hand side of the first equation, together with Q.
This implies that if there is an equilibrium (whether discriminatory or non-discriminatory)
with Q and β, then effectively the same equilibrium exists with Qβ1/k and 1 as well, and
vice versa. Combining this observation with Theorem 1, it follows that for a fixed value
of Q, a discriminatory equilibrium exists if and only if β ∈ (β,β), where Qβ1/k = Q and
Qβ
1/k
=Q. Q.E.D.
For an intuition, recall that discrimination arises in our model because a seller’s group
identity may provide extra information about her productive type. Such extra informa-
tion is of little value when ratings are sufficiently uninformative (i.e., β is close to 0) or
sufficiently informative (i.e., β is large). It can make a large enough difference that can
sustain a discriminatory equilibrium only when rating quality belongs to an intermediate
range.
5 Comparison to Coate and Loury (1993a)
Just as in our paper, Coate and Loury (1993a) (CL, hereafter) demonstrated that dis-
criminatory outcomes can arise despite no exogenous differences between two groups.
They considered a labor market model in which workers invest in their human capital
and employers assign a job to each worker based on the worker’s group identity and a
noisy signal about the worker’s human capital. They showed that discrimination can re-
sult from a “self-fulfilling prophecy”: employers believe that group 2 workers are less
likely to invest in their human capital than group 1 workers and, therefore, assign less
group 2 workers to a better job than group 1 workers. Expecting lower returns, group 2
workers indeed invest in their human capital less than group 1 workers.
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The underlying mechanism behind statistical discrimination in our model differs from
that of CL in several important ways. First, the discrimination in our model is based
on rational inference on sellers’ transaction histories (“ratings”), and thus it does not
require endogenous human capital acquisition as in CL. The perspectives on the cause
of discrimination also differ. In the latter, “future” anticipated discrimination discour-
ages the candidates in the discriminated group from acquiring skills, thus validating the
discrimination in equilibrium. In our theory, “past” discrimination disadvantages the
discriminated sellers/workers in the inference formed by prospective buyers/employers
about their good ratings, thus perpetuating discrimination.
Second, unlike CL, the existence of discriminatory equilibrium in our model does not
rely on multiplicity of non-discriminatory equilibria. In CL, discrimination arises when
(and because) different groups coordinate on different equilibria, making multiplicity of
non-discriminatory equilibria a necessary and sufficient condition for discrimination. As
explained in Section 4, in our model, a discriminatory equilibrium can exist even if there
is a unique non-discriminatory equilibrium.
Finally, while the non-discriminatory equilibrium is stable in CL, it is often unstable
in our model: as shown in Proposition 4 and Theorem 2, when a discriminatory equi-
librium exists, the non-discriminatory equilibrium can be unstable, while there always
exists a stable discriminatory equilibrium. This means that discrimination is a more ro-
bust prediction in our model than in CL.
It is worth noting that, despite the above differences, the effect recognized in our the-
ory is consistent with, and further reinforced by, the force that Coate and Loury identi-
fied. Namely, the payoff gap between H and L types is higher for group 1 than for group
2 in the asymmetric equilibrium, suggesting that the incentive for becoming type H will
be higher for the former group if indeed the type is endogenous, as envisioned by Coate
and Loury (1993a).
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Arranging the equations for PLG, PHB, and PLB, we get
PLG =
δ
δ +ψGα
PHG, PHB =
δ
δ +ψBα
PLB, and PLB = PHB +
ψGα
δ
PLG.
Combining the latter two equations yields
PLB =
δ
δ +ψBα
PLB +
ψGα
δ
PLG =
ψG(δ +ψBα)
δψB
PLG.
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Since the total measure of workers is always equal to 1, we have
1 = PHG +PLG +PLB +PHB = PHG
[
1+
δ
δ +ψGα
(
1+
ψG(δ +ψBα)
δψB
(
1+
δ
δ +ψBα
))]
.
Arranging the terms, we get the expression for PHG. From there, we can also find the
expressions for PLG, PLB, and PHB as well. The results for µG and µB are immediate from
the solutions to PHG, PLG, PLB, and PHB. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall from Lemma 1 that
µG = 1−
δ
2δ +ψGα
and µB =
δ
2δ +ψBα
.
Therefore,
uG(λ) = φ(λ)(µGyH + (1− µG)yL −w) =
ψ(λ)
λ
(
(uH −w)− (uH − uL)
δ
2δ +ψ(λ)α
)
,
and
uB(λ) = φ(λ)(µByH + (1− µB)yL −w) =
ψ(λ)
λ
(
δ
2δ +ψBα
(yH − yL) + yL −w
)
.
The continuity of uj(λ) follows from the same property of φ(λ) and µj (λ).
If λ tends to 0, then µj approaches 1/2 for both j = G,B. The result that limλ→0uj(λ) =
∞ then follows from the fact that (yH + yL)/2 −w > 0 and limλ→0φ(λ) =∞. For the case
when λ tends to infinity, observe that
µj (λ) = φ(λ)(µGyH + (1− µG)yL −w) ≤ φ(λ)(yH −w).
The desired result is immediate because limλ→∞φ(λ) = 0.
The monotonicity of uB(λ) follows from the fact that both φ(λ) and µB are strictly
decreasing in λ. For uG(λ), observe that
duG(λ)
dλ
=
(
ψ′
λ
−
ψ
λ2
)(
uH −w− (uH − uL)
δ
2δ +ψα
)
+
ψ
λ
(uH − uL)
δαψ′
(2δ+ψα)2
=
1
(2δ+ψα)2
((
ψ′
λ
−
ψ
λ2
)(
(uH −w)(2δ+ψα)
2 − (uH − uL)δ(2δ+ψα)
)
+
ψ
λ
(uH − uL)δαψ
′
)
.
When ψ(λ) = λk , duG(λ)/dλ has the same sign as
h(λ) = −(1− k)(uH −w)(2δ +ψα)
2 + (1− k)(uH − uL)δ(2δ +ψα) + k(uH − uL)δαψ
= −(1− k)α2(uH −w)ψ
2 + (−4(1− k)(uH −w) +uH − uL)δαψ
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−2(1− k)δ2(uH +uL − 2w).
h(λ) is a quadratic equation of ψ, and its maximal value is equal to
(uH − uL − 4(1− k)(uH −w))
2δ2
4(1− k)(uH −w)
− 2(1− k)δ2(uH +uL − 2w),
which has the same sign as
(uH − uL)
2 − 8(1− k)(uH − uL)(uH −w) + 16(1− k)
2(uH −w)
2
−8(1− k)2(uH −w)(uH +uL − 2w)
= 8(uH − uL)(uH −w)
(
(1− k)2 − (1− k) +
uH − uL
8(uH −w)
)
.
Let k ∈ (0,1) be the unique value that equates the maximal value of h(λ) to 0:
1− k =
1−
√
1− uH−uL
2(uH−w)
2
⇒ k =
1+
√
1− uH−uL
2(uH−w)
2
.
If k ≤ k, then h(λ) ≤ 0 for any λ, which implies that uG(λ) is monotone (decreasing). If
k > k, then h(λ) ≤ 0 has two solutions, λG and λG. Then, uG(λ) is strictly increasing if and
only if λ ∈ (λG,λG). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that uG(λ) is not monotone, that is, k ≤ (k,1). Then, as
shown in Lemma 2, there exist λG(> 0) and λG(> λG) such that uG(λ) is strictly decreasing
if and only if λ ∈ (λG,λG). Let λB and λB be the values such that λB = λ
BI
B (λG) (i.e.,
uB(λB) = uG(λG)) and λB = λ
BI
B (λG) (i.e., uB(λB) = uG(λG)), respectively (see Figure 3).
Then, for each λB ∈ [λB,λB], there exist h1(λB), h2(λB), and h3(λB) such that h1(λB) ≤
h2(λB) ≤ h3(λB), with at least one inequality holding strictly if λB = λB or λB = λB and
both inequality holding strictly otherwise, and uB(λB) = uG(hm(λB)) for all m = 1,2,3. By
construction, all hi(λ)’s are continuous over (λB,λB). In addition, h1(λB) and h3(λB) are
strictly increasing, while h2(λB) is strictly decreasing (again, see Figure 3).
By the explanation given just before Theorem 1, every discriminatory equilibrium can
be represented (produced) by two distinct points, λG and λ
′
G, that correspond to the same
value of λB ∈ [λB,λB]. Combining this with the fact that for each λB ∈ [λB,λB], there are
three such values, h1(λB), h2(λB), and h1(λB), it follows that each λB yields three possible
values ofQ’s that lead to a discriminatory equilibrium. In other words, for any pair (m,m′)
such that m,m′ = 1,2,3 and m , m′, it is an equilibrium that one group trades according
to (hm(λB),λB) and the other group trades according to (hm′ (λB),λB) if the total measure
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of firms is given by
Q =Θ(hm(λB),λB) +Θ(hm(λ
′
B),λB),
where Θ(λG,λB) is the measure of buyers necessary to support a steady-state equilibrium
in which one group of sellers trade according to (λG,λB), that is,
Θ(λG,λB) ≡
λGψ(λB)(2δ +αψ(λG))
2(δψ(λG) + δψB +αψ(λG)ψ(λB))
+
λBψ(λG)(2δ +αψ(λB))
2(δψ(λB) + δψ(λB) +αψ(λG)ψ(λB))
.
In order to show the interval structure of Q’s, for each m = 1,2,3, let Im denote the set
of all Q’s that are associated with hm(λB) and hm+1(λB). Formally, define
Im =
{
Θ(hm(λB),λB) +Θ(hm+1(λB),λB)|λB ∈ [λB,λB]
}
.
Since Θ(λG,λB) is continuous, each Im is an interval. Furthermore, I ≡
⋃
m Im is also an
interval, because
lim
λB→λB
h2(λB) = lim
λB→λB
h3(λB) and lim
λB→λB
h1(λB) = lim
λB→λB
h2(λB).
Q.E.D.
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